Mercer Law Review
Volume 51
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 14

7-2000

Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student Prayer Back in the
Schoolhouse Gate
Sarah Beth Mabery

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mabery, Sarah Beth (2000) "Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student Prayer Back in the Schoolhouse Gate,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 51 : No. 4 , Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol51/iss4/14

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CASENOTES

Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student
Prayer Back in the Schoolhouse Gate
In Chandler v. James,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the district court's order permanently enjoining enforcement of an
Alabama statute that permitted student-initiated religious speech in
public schools.2 The court of appeals concluded that permitting studentinitiated religious speech did not violate the Establishment Clause and
such speech is protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
of the First Amendment.3
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1993 the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute that stated, in
pertinent part, "On public school, other public, or other property, nonsectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer,
invocations and/or benedictions, shall be permitted during compulsory
or non-compulsory school-related student assemblies, school-related
student sporting events, school-related graduation or commencement

1. 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999).

2. Id. at 1256, 1258.
3. Id. at 1263.
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ceremonies, and other school-related student events."4 In 1996, Michael
Chandler, a DeKalb County school vice principal, and his son, a DeKalb
County student, challenged the facial validity of the statute and the
application of it in DeKalb County schools. Named as defendants were
the Governor of Alabama, the State Superintendent of Education, the
members of the State Board of Education, and the DeKalb County and
City of Talladega Superintendents and Boards of Education. The
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted partial
summary judgment for plaintiff in March 1997, holding the statute to be
facially unconstitutional. The district court permanently enjoined
DeKalb County from enforcing the statute. The permanent injunction
prohibited defendants from permitting all but private student prayer.
In November the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order, which stated that defendants unconstitutionally organized or
sponsored religious activities. The court also granted plaintiffs summary
judgment on the claim that the statute was applied unconstitutionally
and appointed a monitor to oversee enforcement of the injunction. All
defendants appealed; although, the Governor only appealed on the
ground that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause does not apply
to the states. The remaining defendants appealed regarding whether the
district court could require them to prohibit nonprivate student-initiated
prayer.5 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the court
erred in permanently enjoining DeKalb County from permitting studentinitiated prayer and remanded the case.6
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The constitutionality of the district court's permanent injunction
prohibiting DeKalb County from permitting student-initiated religious
speech that is not purely private depends upon the distinction the
United States Supreme Court has made between private and government action. Also important to the disposition of this issue are the
rights of students within the school setting.
The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech."7 The Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states.8

4. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995 & Supp. 1998).
5. 180 F.3d at 1256-57.
6. Id. at 1265-66.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

8. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (applying the freedom
of religion clauses to the states); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (applying the
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The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of prayer in school in
Engel v. Vitale.' The Court concluded that the use in classrooms of a
prayer written by government officials as part of a program to promote
religious activities violated the "constitutional wall of separation between
Church and State" because the state and federal government lack the
power to designate an official prayer.' ° Likewise, in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp," the Court struck down as unconstitutional statutes requiring a reading from the Bible, without comment on
the reading, at the beginning of each school day.'2 This was because
the state and federal government cannot pass laws that "'aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.'"' 3
According to the Court, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
mandate governmental neutrality with regard to religion.' 4
A.

The EstablishmentClause

In these first two school prayer cases, the Court addressed the issue
of a state imposing religious activity on school children, and in the
subsequent cases to be discussed, the Court addressed the issue of
private actors. In Widmar v. Vincent," the Court decided whether
state actors can prohibit private speakers from using university facilities
for religious speech.'" The Court concluded that by providing the
university's facilities to registered student organizations, the university
created an open forum and must justify exclusion of religious clubs
under applicable constitutional norms.' By prohibiting religious clubs
from using its facilities, the university imposed a content-based exclusion
that could only be sustained by showing that the exclusion was
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was narrowly
drawn. 8 The university asserted compliance with the Establishment
Clause as its compelling interest.'
While agreeing that compliance
with the Establishment Clause is a compelling interest, the Court did
not find that the "equal access" policy necessarily conflicted with the

freedom of speech clause to the states).
9. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. Id. at 425, 430.
11. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
12. Id. at 205.
13. Id. at 216 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
14. See id. at 215, 222.
15. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
16. See id. at 264-65.
17. Id. at 267-68.
18. Id. at 269-70.
19. Id. at 270.
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Establishment Clause.2" In concluding that an open forum policy that
was nondiscriminatory toward religious speech would provide religion
with only incidental benefits, the Court held that an open forum does not
confer "any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices."2 The Court was also persuaded by the fact that the open forum
is available to religious as well as nonreligious speakers, and the Establishment Clause does not prohibit extending general benefits to religious
groups.2 2 However, this does not mean that the university could not
establish reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.23
Following Widmar, in 1984 Congress adopted the Equal Access Act
(the "EAA")2 4 requiring "equal access" policies in public secondary
schools under certain circumstances and in compliance with specific
guidelines.2" The EAA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum
on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings.2"
In addition to requiring equal access policies, the EAA delineates certain
criteria for offering a fair opportunity, including the following: that
meetings be student initiated and voluntary; that the school, government, or its agents or employees do not sponsor meetings; and that
agents or employees of the school or government only attend religious
meetings in a "nonparticipatory capacity."27 The EAA further prohibits
the states or their political subdivisions from requiring participation in
religious activities or from influencing content or form of any religious
activities.2" By enacting these provisions Congress sought to clearly
distinguish between activities initiated and controlled by students and
those initiated and controlled by the school or government: The former
is permitted while the latter is prohibited.

20. Id. at 271.
21. Id. at 274.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 276.
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).

25. Id.
26. Id. § 4071(a).
27. Id. § 4071(c)(1)-(c)(3).

28. Id. § 4071(d).
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In 1989 the Court interpreted the EAA and ruled on its constitutionality in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.29
The Court recognized that in passing the EAA, Congress had extended
the holding in Widmar to public secondary schools.3 0 The Court
proceeded to interpret the meaning of the phrase "noncurriculum related
student group" to determine if Westside High School had to provide
equal access to a Christian club. 3' While a majority of the Court
agreed with regard to the statutory interpretation, the Court was divided
with regard to the rationale for upholding the EAA as constitutional.32
In her opinion for the plurality, Justice O'Connor examined Widmar,
concluding that the Court reasoned that opening university facilities to
religious groups sends a message of "neutrality rather than endorseThe plurality found the logic of Widmar applicable and
ment."'
concluded that a school does not endorse student speech when the speech
is allowed on a nondiscriminatory basis.34 The plurality recognized
concern over actions being perceived as government support of religion
in the "eyes of impressionable youngsters." 5 However, there is "a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, andprivatespeech endorsing religion,
In
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."
addition, secondary school students are mature enough to recognize that
the school is not endorsing student speech it merely permits.3 7 As an
additional safeguard, the statute prohibits active participation by school
officials and limits such meetings to "noninstructional time"; therefore,
there is little risk, if any, of state endorsement or coercion. 8 Also, the
school could avoid any "mistaken inference of endorsement" by making

29. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). The majority wrote an opinion on the statutory interpretation
regarding the applicability of the Equal Access Act to Westside High School. Id. at 231-47.
Justice O'Connor delivered the plurality opinion regarding the constitutionality of the
Equal Access Act. Id. at 247-53. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 258-62. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 262-70. Justice

Stevens dissented. Id. at 270-91.
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id. at 234, 237 (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (b)).
32. See id. at 247; See id. at 258 (Kennedy, J., concurring); See id. at 262-63 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
33. Id. at 248 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 248, 250.
35. Id. at 250 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
36. Id. at 250 (emphasis supplied by court).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 251 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b), (c)(2), (c)(3)).
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it clear that recognition of a club is not an endorsement of the members'
views.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,4 ° the Court concluded that an Alabama statute
which permitted a moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer " was unconstitutional because it indicated the state's intent
that prayer be considered the favored practice. 42 Justice O'Connor,
concurring, stated that the Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from "conveying or attempting to convey a message that
religion... is favored."4 A state-sponsored moment of silence could be
constitutional, if properly written, because it is "not inherently religious"; moreover, "[by mandating a moment of silence, a State does not
necessarily endorse" what happens during that period."
Thus, the Court has concluded that a state does not establish religion
by merely granting secondary or university students who promote
religion access to facilities equal to that given students promoting
secular ideas. In fact, schools are required to treat all student speech
equally once they have opened the forum to student speech. However,
a state cannot convey a preference for religious speech in the guise of
allowing students to exercise their First Amendment rights to free
speech.
45
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
the Court examined the school district's rules permitting use of school
property by nonstudents for social, civic, or recreational uses but not for
religious purposes. Based upon those rules, the school district denied
the request of Lamb's Chapel to use school facilities for showing a film
series on family and child-rearing with a religious tone.4 The Court
indicated that control over use of public property that is not a public
forum can be based on subject matter, but must be reasonable in light
of the forum's purpose and must be viewpoint neutral. 47 A speaker
could not be excluded from a nonpublic forum based on the view
espoused if the speaker's subject was one that would otherwise be

39. Id.
40. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
41. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984), repealed by ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 9 (Supp.

1999).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

472 U.S. at 40, 60-61.
Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 72-73.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
Id. at 387.

47. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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includable in the forum." While such exclusion would normally be
unconstitutional, the discrimination could be saved by an Establishment
Clause defense.4" The school district's denial would be saved if
permitting such use of the facilities would be an establishment of
religion; here, however, fears of an Establishment Clause violation were
unfounded.50 The Court concluded no real danger of the community
believing that the school district was endorsing a general or a particular
religion existed.5 1
Thus, the Court has consistently held that the Establishment Clause
is not violated by permitting religious speakers to use nonpublic school
facilities when there is no appearance of government endorsement of
religion. So long as the government actor affords religious speakers who
are not government actors the same opportunity to use government
facilities as given to secular speakers, no danger of a perception of
government endorsement exists. Absent such a perception, the
Establishment Clause is not violated.
The Court extended the equal access requirement to include access to
funding as well as facilities in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia.5 2 The university had denied Student Activity
Funds to a Contracted Independent Organization ("CIO") called Wide
Awake Productions because publishing its newspaper constituted a
religious activity.53 Under university guidelines, a CIO had to include

a disclaimer that it is independent of the university in all dealings with
third parties and all its writings.5 4 The Court began by indicating that
the state may use content discrimination to preserve the purposes of a
limited forum, but may not use viewpoint discrimination. 5 Content
discrimination distinguishes speech based on the subject of the speech

48. Id. at 394 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
49. Id. (quoting May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
50. Id. at 394-95 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263).
51. Id. at 395.
52. 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
53. Id. at 827. The university had guidelines governing which student organizations
were eligible for Student Activity Funds. To be eligible, the organization had to be a
Contracted Independent Organization ("CIO"). To be a CIO, the organization had to meet
certain requirements. Then, to receive Student Activity Funds for third-party payment of
publishing costs incurred by the organization, a CIO had to meet certain requirements.
Certain student activites could not receive reimbursement by the Student Activity Fund.
Among those are religious activities, which were defined as any activity that "primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." Id.
at 823-27.
54. Id. at 823.

55. Id. at 829-30.

1316

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

while viewpoint discrimination distinguishes speech based on the point
of view the speaker espouses regarding the subject of the speech."
Noting the imprecision of the distinction, the Court concluded that the
denial of third-party payment of the newspaper's publishing costs was
viewpoint discrimination." The university was "not exclud[ing] religion
as a subject matter," but disfavoring student publications with "religious
editorial viewpoints."58 The Court further held that, while viewpoint
discrimination could be proper when the university actually speaks or
subsidizes transmittal of its favored message, the university may not
impose viewpoint restrictions when it uses funds "to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers."59 Likewise, the scarcity of
resources does not warrant viewpoint discrimination in allocating funds,
but requires allocation based on neutral principles.'
However, the
university's actions may have been necessary in order to comply with the
Establishment Clause.6 1 The Court acknowledged a difference between
government speech endorsing religion and private speech doing so and
recognized that the university had made a point to disassociate itself
from the private speech in this case.62 The Court also found that using
government funds to pay third-party contractors is no different than
using funds to maintain facilities when access is on a religion-neutral
basis and religious groups use the facilities.'
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government from
establishing religion. As the cases above indicate, a private speaker may
endorse religion, but the government may not. However, when a private
speaker endorses religion, the state may violate the Establishment
Clause if its actions toward the speaker convey the message of state
endorsement of religion. This does not occur when the state takes a
neutral position with regard to religious speakers and provides them
with access equal that provided to secular speakers.
B.

The Free Speech Clause in the School Context
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," the Court
addressed a challenge to a Board of Education resolution requiring a

56. See id. at 829-31.
57. Id. at 831.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 833-34.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 841 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
Id. at 843.
319 U.S. 624 (1942).
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salute and pledge to the United States flag. The Court found the pledge
and salute to be a form of utterance and that the compulsory flag salute
required an affirmation of a belief."5 The Court concluded that the
compulsory flag salute and pledge violated the constitution.66
A second important case regarding a student's right to free speech at
school is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.67 The Court stated in Tinker that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' s However, a student's First Amendment rights are to be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." 9 A student's exercise of free speech cannot be restricted unless
it "materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of other[]" students.70
After restricting the school's ability to regulate student speech in
Tinker, the Court modified the constraint on schools in Bethel School
71
District No. 403 v. Fraser.
When a student challenged his having
been disciplined for using a sexual metaphor at a school assembly, the
Court concluded that the school was permitted to determine that vulgar
speech would undermine the educational mission of the school.72 The
Court recognized in the school setting a need to weigh the freedom to
espouse unpopular and controversial ideas against society's interest in
teaching the appropriate social boundaries of behavior.73 The fact that
adults may use an offensive expression to make a political point does not
mean that students must be given the same latitude in public schools. 74
Therefore, it is appropriate for the school board to determine what
manner of speech is inappropriate in the classroom or school assem75
bly.
The Court further addressed the extent to which the school could
restrict student speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.76

65. Id. at 632, 633. The Court stated, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.

66. Id.
67. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

68. Id. at 506.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 513.
71.

478 U.S. 675, 685-87 (1986).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 677-78, 685.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).

1318

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

The Court recognized a distinction between the issues of whether the
First Amendment requires tolerance of particular student speech and
whether it requires promotion of particular student speech." Teachers
and administrators are vested with greater control over expressive
activities that may be characterized as part of the school curriculum
than activities that are a student's personal expression.m7 Activities
that may be characterized as part of the curriculum are those "supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge
or skills to student participants and audiences."79
C. The Free Exercise Clause
Finally, regulation of student speech regarding religion also has free
exercise implications. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,8 ° the Court recognized that the First Amendment protections of religion are twofold: they
prohibit laws that compel acceptance of. a particular religion and
safeguard the ability to exercise one's chosen religion."' A freedom to
believe is absolute while a freedom to act is not.82 The power to
regulate cannot unduly infringe on the free exercise, but the state may
regulate the
time, place, and manner through general, nondiscriminatory
8 3
legislation.

Thus, in Braunfeld v. Brown,84 the Court held that a law with the
purpose or effect of "imped[ing] the observance of one or all'religions or
... discriminat[ing] invidiously between religions" is invalid, even if the
burden is indirect.8 5 However, when legislation regulating conduct
indirectly burdens religion, the statute is constitutional unless there are
means to accomplish the purpose that will not burden religion.88 The
Court has also held that the Free Exercise Clause is violated when a
legislative enactment has a coercive effect on an individual's religious
practice.8 7 Finally, a state may justify restraint on religious liberty by
showing that it is using the least restrictive means to further a
compelling state interest.8 8

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Id. at 607.
Id.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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Therefore, while schools may control student speech, there are limits
upon that control. The school has more control over student speech that
may be regarded as promoted by the school than over personal student
speech. Also, restraint on student speech cannot unduly burden a
student's right to the free exercise of religion.
In conclusion, a school must maintain a policy of neutrality towards
religious speech by students. Doing otherwise would risk violating the
First Amendment in one of two ways. On one hand, state involvement
in, or perceived endorsement of, religious speech by students would
violate the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, state prohibition
of religious speech by students would violate the students' free speech
and exercise rights.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In Chandler the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals three-judge panel
unanimously held that the District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama erred in permanently enjoining DeKalb County from permitting
student-initiated prayer in public schools.89 Writing for the court,
Judge Hill quickly rejected the Governor of Alabama's claim that the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause does not apply to the states. 90
Therefore, the district court was correct in subjecting the law to
constitutional scrutiny. 91
The remaining defendants did not challenge the district court's ruling
that the statute was facially unconstitutional, nor did they challenge the
district court's injunction prohibiting the school from prescribing prayer
and allowing state employees to participate in or endorse prayer during
school activities. However, defendants did challenge the portion of the
injunction that prohibited them from permitting students to exercise any
type of religious speech that is not purely private. Defendants argued
that such a prohibition violates the students' rights under the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. 2
The court first addressed defendants' argument that students cannot
establish a religion because they are not state actors.93 Defendants
based the argument on the principle that any governmental body is
prohibited from acting so as to establish a religion and because students
are not state actors their speech cannot establish religion.9 4 The court

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

180 F.3d at 1256, 1265-66.
Id. at 1257 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; Everson, 330 U.S. at 8).
Id.
Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1258.

94. Id.
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recognized that a private party cannot ordinarily establish religion
through religious speech, even when speaking in a public institution like
a school.95 However, if the state uses the private party as a channel
then the private party's speech can violate the Establishment Clause."
The state cannot command religious speech, either by directly requiring
religious speech or by allowing private parties to speak while limiting
the message to religious speech. 7 Though the state cannot command
religious speech, this does not mean that the state is required to be
"'hostil[e] toward religion or toward prayer.'"

Next the court examined student speech with regard to the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses." The government must be neutral
with regard to religion; however, this requirement of neutrality does not
require suppression of student-initiated religious speech.10° In fact,
suppression "demonstrates not neutrality but hostility toward religion."' 01 Prohibiting all religious speech in schools has the effect of
establishing disbelief and implies an "unconstitutional disapproval of
religion." °2 However, permitting religious student speech conveys
neither approval nor disapproval, and it is not the state's speech "by
attribution or by adoption."' 3 The Constitution requires accommodation of all religions; therefore, student-initiated speech can be accommodated without constituting an unconstitutional state establishment of
religion."° Even if the speech advances religion, it does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it is private speech protected by the First
Amendment."'
Therefore, the question was not whether school officials may require
religious speech, or whether school officials may prohibit religious speech
in schools, because they can do neither.0 ' Rather, the question was
this: What sort of time, place, and manner limits may the school impose
on student-initiated religious speech?' 7 Answering the question

95. Id. (citing Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250).

96. Id. at 1259.
97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1260 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 434).
Id.
Id. at 1261 (quoting Shempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis supplied by court).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 1262 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273).
105. Id. at 1263 (citing Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir.
1992), impliedly overruled on othergrounds, Doe v. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806
(5th Cir. 1999).

106. Id.
107.

Id.
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required the Court to balance the right to pray with the right to be free
from government-required prayer. l"
The court stated that a school can accommodate religious expression
without commanding it by simply allowing students or other private
individuals to exercise their First Amendment right to speak religiously. 109
The school must permit truly student-initiated religious
speech."'
The court noted that the state cannot participate in or
supervise the speech."' "Supervise" does not mean the mere presence
of a teacher, but supervision is an unconstitutional endorsement when
it crosses the line into active endorsement, encouragement, or participation." 2 The court also noted that students' religious speech may be
subject to the same reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
placed on secular student speech at school."' Also, students do not
have the right to use the "machinery of the state" as a means to convert
their audience." 4 Students are permitted religious speech, not religious proselytizing." 5
The court concluded by upholding the district court's appointment of
a monitor."' This was not an abuse of the district court's discretion
because there was evidence that school personnel acted unconstitutionally to do more than permit the students'
religious activities by participat7
ing or encouraging such activity.1
In his concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat addressed sua sponte the
appropriate uses and nature of injunctions." 8 Punitive, compensatory,
and coercive contempt sanctions are used to enforce injunctions."'
The type of sanction available depends upon the type of conduct to be
enjoined. 20 Based upon both the principle that equity will not be used
when there is an adequate remedy at law and concern over separation
of powers issues, Judge Tjoflat concluded that injunctions should only be

108. Id. at 1263-64.
109. Id. at 1264.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Doe v. Duncanville Ind. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1995)).
112. Id. at 1264-65 n.19 (citing Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 410 (Jones, J., concurring and
dissenting)).

113. Id. at 1264-65.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1265.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1266-77 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1268.
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entered when they can be enforced through coercive contempt sanctions.121
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The holding in Chandler is consistent with prior First Amendment
cases. 12 2 The court recognized the distinction between government and
private action, which has been a major focus of Supreme Court cases on
the Establishment Clause. Its conclusion that student-initiated religious
speech is private action is likewise consistent with precedent.
This holding has both a general effect and a more specific implication.
First, this case has welcomed prayer back into schools within the
Eleventh Circuit. The court has concluded that truly student-initiated
religious speech is permitted in the schools.123 Additionally, it has set
general guidelines regarding religious speech in school.' 24 The likely
result is that state legislatures and school boards within the Eleventh
Circuit's jurisdiction will begin passing laws or establishing policies
modeled after the Alabama statute.
However, Chandler is not likely to be the last case dealing with
religious speech in schools for the Eleventh Circuit. In fact, this ruling
could result in a resurgence of cases dealing with religious speech in
school. This increase will result from the struggle to further define the
limits of school officials' involvement in student-initiated prayer. The
court in Chandler gave only general guidance for school officials,
prohibiting active endorsement, encouragement, and participation. One
does not need to be clairvoyant to foresee several cases in the future
challenging whether school officials have stepped over the line into the
territory of unconstitutional establishment of religion; whether the time,
place, and manner restrictions imposed are appropriate; and whether the
statutes and policies are too broad or too narrow. The Eleventh Circuit
has opened the school gate for religious speech with this case, which will
be heralded by some and lamented by others. However, the Eleventh
Circuit has not resolved the issue once and for all.
In fact, the entire Eleventh Circuit will be holding an en banc
rehearing of Adler v. Duval County School Board,'25 a case similar to
Chandler. In 1993 the Duval County School Superintendent sent all
high school principals in the county school system a memorandum which

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
at 1271.

Id. at 1266.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-88.
See 180 F.3d at 1263.
See id. at 1264-65.
174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). The rehearing was ordered on June 3, 1999. Id.

20001

CHANDLER V. JAMES

1323

contained guidelines regarding permitting seniors to vote for a brief
opening and/or closing message to be delivered at graduation by a
student volunteer; the memo instructed that the content of the message
be composed by the student volunteer and not be monitored or reviewed
by Duval County School personnel. 2 ' In a two-to-one decision, the
panel held that based on Lee v. Weisman'27 and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 2' the policy of permitting seniors to decide whether to have an
unrestricted message delivered by a student at graduation facially
violates the Establishment Clause.'29 This decision was vacated and
30
a rehearing en banc ordered.
In light of the panel's decision in Chandler,the en banc hearing of
Adler may possibly result in a decision similar to that in Chandler.
From the unanimous vote in Chandler and the dissent in Adler, it
appears that at least four of the Eleventh Circuit judges believe that the
Constitution not only permits student-initiated religious speech, but

protects it as well. 131

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe 3 2 will not affect Chandler. The policy at issue in Santa
Fe permitted students to vote for having an invocation and/or message
delivered before football games by a student elected to do so for the
season.'
The Court held that the policy was unconstitutional because
it "establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and
unquestionably has the purpose and creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school events." 34
The key differences between Santa Fe and Chandlerare the encouragement of prayer and school involvement with prayer that was present in
Santa Fe and absent in Chandler.
SARAH BETH MA1BERY
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